D ecades of survey research have provided us with countless examples of voter ignorance.
While the existence of the badly informed voter is now a central part of political science's intellectual heritage, the implications of voter ignorance continue to be vigorously debated. Many scholars and pundits argue that widespread voter ignorance leads to voting behavior and electoral outcomes that are meaningless representations of voter interests.' Other political observers argue that voters find ways to adapt to their apparent lack of information. These scholars conclude that voting behavior and electoral outcomes provide valuable measures of voter interests.2
To understand whether or not voters can successfully overcome their lack of information, it is instructive to consider briefly how voters can obtain information about the personal consequences of electoral outcomes. I conduct this review in the particularly appropriate context of a direct legislation election. In direct legislation elections (e.g., the initiative and the referendum), voters make selections from an exogenously determined menu of specific policy alternatives called propositions. A defining characteristic of many propositions is complexity.3 Since voters who encounter a complex proposition for the first time are likely to be confused about the consequences of its approval, the extent to which voters can adapt to their initial condition of ignorance will determine how well they can promote their own interests through the act of voting.
Voters who have an interest in the outcome of a direct legislation election might first consider gathering facts about a proposition from the official document that describes its content. However, these documents are usually lengthy and/or filled with technical language. As a result, voters in large electorates who consider their opportunity costs may decide that the acquisition of "encyclopedic" information is not a worthwhile activity.
As an alternative to the costly acquisition of encyclopedic information, voters may choose to employ information shortcuts. For example, voters can acquire information about the preferences or opinions of friends, coworkers, political parties, or other groups, which they may then use to infer how a proposition will affect them. The appeal of these information shortcuts is that they generally require relatively little effort to acquire. The drawback of these shortcuts is that they may be unreliable, since relatively well informed information providers may have incentives to mislead relatively uninformed voters. Because many of my colleagues and I were curious about the extent to which relatively uninformed voters could use information shortcuts to cast the same votes they would have cast if better informed, I designed and administered an exit poll of California voters who, in 1988, were confronted by five distinct and complex insurance reform propositions. The survey responses allow me to identify a class of voters who, while appearing to possess relatively low levels of encyclopedic knowledge about the content of insurance reform initiatives, used an information shortcut that allowed them to emulate the behavior of well-informed voters. Specifically, I find that relatively uninformed voters who could correctly identify the insurance industry's official position on a particular proposition were much more likely to emulate the behavior of relatively well informed voters on that proposition than were similarly uninformed voters who did not know the insurance industry's position. I conclude from this finding that if relatively well informed voters are most likely to cast the votes that are consistent with their own interests, then knowledge of the insurance industry's position allowed voters who might otherwise be classified as ignorant to act as they would have if they had taken the time and effort necessary to acquire encyclopedic information. While the analysis I present does not lead me to conclude that shortcuts will always be sufficient to help uninformed voters overcome their lack of knowledge, I believe that it is suggestive of the March 1994 conditions under which voters who have not acquired encyclopedic knowledge can vote as though they had.
Next, I offer a brief history of the events leading up to the insurance reform elections. I then place relevant aspects of this history within the context of previous theoretical and empirical research on voter decision making in order to generate predictions about how different types of information should affect voting behavior. I then offer a description of the survey instrument's construction and execution and employ a number of statistical tests to identify the effects of certain types of information on respondent voting behavior. With this survey, and related theoretical and experimental research on the responsiveness of direct legislation,4 I hope to advance more general debates about the nature of voter competence and the substantive meaning of electoral outcomes.
INSURANCE REFORM AND THE INFORMATION PROBLEM
What events led up to the insurance reform elections and how do they figure in the context of previous work on voter decision making?
A Brief History
In 1987, California drivers paid the third highest auto insurance rates in the nation. Both the state's trial lawyers-who receive half of their case load from automobile accident claims (Reich 1988a )-and the insurance industry recognized the widespread public support for regulatory reform and both were interested in influencing the legislative reform agenda. Each group publicly blamed the other for the recent rapid increase in auto insurance premiums. Insurance industry spokesmen argued that higher rates were caused by skyrocketing legal costs and publicly supported regulatory reforms that assigned most of the costs of reform to trial lawyers (e.g., laws that limit attorney fees, decrease the likelihood of large settlements, or both.) In contrast, the California Trial Lawyers Association (CTLA) publicly portrayed the insurance industry as greedy oligopolists who were conspiring against consumers. The CTLA supported regulatory reform that assigned most of the costs of reform to the insurance industry (e.g., the elimination of the insurance industry's exemption from many of California's antitrust laws).
Both groups attempted to influence insurance reform through their lobbying efforts in the state capitol. In this domain, the insurance reform debate was a battle of Titans. Both the insurers and attorneys had what were among the most influential lobbies in California (Reich 1987a Only one of the five qualifying propositions passed on Election Day: Proposition 103 was sponsored by the consumer activist group Voter Revolt (whose primary spokesman during the campaign was Ralph Nader) and received 51.1% of the vote. Proposition 103 called for the removal of the insurance industry's antitrust exemption, public hearings as a prerequisite for rate changes, auto insurance premiums to be determined primarily by driving record (as opposed to where one lived), a premium discount for "good drivers," election of the state's insurance commissioner (rather than gubernatorial appointment), and a mandatory 20% reduction on all auto insurance premiums.
Of the four initiatives that lost, one was sponsored by trial lawyer interests, and three were sponsored by insurance industry interests. Proposition 100 was sponsored by the CTLA and received 40.9% of the vote. This proposition called for the reduction of "good driver" rates by 20% and the institution of health insurance rate regulation. It also allowed banks to sell insurance and allowed claimants to sue insurance companies for acting in "bad faith." Proposition 104, the no-fault initiative, was the insurance industry's most favored proposition (as evidenced by the fact that the insurance industry spent much more to promote this proposition than it did to promote the others). Despite this status, it was approved by only 25.4% of the voters. This proposition called for the establishment of a no-fault system of auto insurance (thus eliminating the need for many types of legal recourse in the event of an accident), the reduction of some premiums by 20% for two years, a restriction on future insurance regulation legislation, limitations on damage awards against insurance companies, limitations on attorney contingency fees, and the preservation of the insurance industry's antitrust status. Other characteristics led me to believe that there would also be a vigorous campaign. The first of these characteristics is that reform of the state's insurance regulation was-and still is-a highly salient issue. Each of the five initiatives corresponded to a significant change in the insurance regulatory framework and each had the potential to affect the price or expected value of many insurance policies, as well as insurance industry profits and trial-lawyer case loads. Second, the potential effect of different electoral outcomes on their profit margins led me to expect, a priori, that there would be high levels of campaign expenditure by the insurance industry and trial lawyers. (Over $82 million was actually spent on the insurance reform campaigns.) Because the insurance reform elections had these four characteristics, I expected that there would be complex electoral decisions, many confused voters, a vigorous campaign, and a unique opportunity to examine how different types of information affect voter behavior.
Sources of Information
Insurance reform voters had access to different types of information than voters in candidate-based elections typically do. The most notable difference was the absence of two types of information that are widely believed to affect voting behavior in elections involving candidates. The first type of missing information was the partisan cue. Not one of the initiatives had a party label attached to it.8 This absence is particularly relevant because much of the contemporary understanding of voting behavior relies on the notion of voters taking cues from party labels.
The second familiar type of missing information was the past. Retrospective evaluations, of the type considered by Downs (1957) , Key (1966) In addition to the absence of some common types of information, the insurance reform elections included two sources of information that are not generally available in other electoral environments. First, the state provided a summary of each initiative. The summaries for the five insurance reform initiatives appear in Appendix A and were available in many places, including on the ballot itself. The summaries were between 25 and 100 words long and were intended to help voters distinguish between the initiatives. While each summary provided some information about an initiative, certain characteristics of the summary limited its effectiveness. For instance, a summary's brevity often resulted in the omission of important components of a complex initiative.
A second source of state-provided information was the California Ballot Pamphlet. The pamphlet for the November 1988 election was a thick document that contained, for each proposition, the summary just described, one signed argument by proponents, one signed counterargument by opponents, one signed argument by opponents, one signed counterargument by proponents, and the actual text of the proposed changes to the law. The fact that voters could obtain a great deal of information from the California Ballot Pamphlet is not in question. However, whether voters might reasonably be expected to spend the time and effort required to learn from the pamphlet is questionable and undermines its potential effectiveness.
A final source of information was the campaign waged by the three affected interest groups: the insurance industry, the CTLA, and consumer activists. Together, these three groups spent more than $82 million on the campaign. Table 1 details strategies employed by the large information providers. In the advertisements purchased by the insurance industry and trial lawyers, the identity of the sponsor was as well hidden as the law would allow. Except for the small print at the bottom of print advertisements or the rapidly disappearing disclaimer that surfaced in broadcast media, the fact that a particular message was associated with the preferences of the insurance industry or trial lawyers was not mentioned. These strategies gave all of the paid advertisements the quality that groups supporting an initiative attempted to represent themselves, and their initiative, as "proconsumer," regardless of their source of financial support, while groups opposing an initiative represented the initiative they were campaigning against as "anticonsumer". So, unlike either scientists and engineers (Kuklinski, Metlay, and May 1982) or major political parties in candidatecentered elections, the insurance industry and trial lawyers did not want to be used as reference groups by the voters-a circumstance that further complicated the voters' ability to understand the likely effects of five complex propositions.
Shortcuts and Voter Inference
If insurance reform voters faced complex alternatives, were too busy or disinterested to acquire encyclopedic information, and could rely on neither the past nor partisan cues, how did they decide which propositions to vote for? To place this case study in a broader context and to motivate the empirical tests that follow, I briefly review some research that is relevant in attempting to understand the behavior of insurance reform voters. Particularly appropriate for this case study are the dynamics described in strategic models of communication, more commonly known as "signaling" games. In a signaling game, a relatively well informed information provider has information that is relevant to a relatively uninformed decision maker.9 The information provider can attempt to affect the decision maker's behavior by sending a "signal" about the consequences of the decision maker's actions. The inferences that the decision maker is able to draw from the content of the signal depend on prior beliefs about both the information provider's knowledge and the information provider's incentives for truth telling. Since the information providers in the insurance reform example also drafted the propositions, I proceed as though it were common knowledge that the information providers understood the content of the propositions and focus this review on the relationship between an information provider's credibility and voter inference.
When either the information provider or the content of the signal is known to be perfectly credible, several scholars have argued that voters can use the content of a signal to make more accurate inferences about the personal consequences of an electoral outcome. Calvert (1985) , Ordeshook (1985, 1986) , and Grofman and Norrander (1990) use spatial models of candidate-centered elections, while I (Lupia 1992) used a spatial model of direct legislation, to identify conditions under which the existence of perfectly credible signals are sufficient to allow in-completely informed voters to emulate the behavior of better or completely informed voters. In these studies, uninformed voters tend to find it in their interests to cast the same vote as the information provider when they know that they and the information provider have similar preferences over outcomes. The same dynamic allows relatively uninformed voters to emulate the behavior they would exhibit if well informed by voting against the information provider's preferred alternative when they know that the information provider's interests are contrary to their own. Unfortunately, these arguments are of limited helpfulness when we attempt to understand voter decision making in circumstances where information providers are not perfectly credible and may, in fact, have an incentive to mislead voters. Sobel (1985) and Brady and Sniderman (1985) have presented arguments suggesting that the existence of a "reputation for honesty" or "likability" is sufficient to allow voters to condition their voting behavior on the content of a signal provided by an information provider who is not perfectly credible. Sobel uses a repeated-play signaling model to show that if an information provider (who is not initially assumed to be perfectly credible) can establish a reputation for some consistent quality, like honesty, then badly informed decision makers can make more accurate inferences about the options available to them from the content of a signal whose truthfulness cannot otherwise be easily established. Brady and Sniderman use the National Election Studies to show that voters in candidate-centered elections rely on their feelings toward information-providing groups better to understand the relationship between their own preferences and those of the candidate.10
In the absence of perfectly credible signals, could insurance reform voters have used their knowledge or perceptions of a particular information provider's reputation to help them understand the personal consequences of a particular electoral outcome? The theories I have reviewed-and others like themsuggest that the answer is yes, but only if voter perceptions of an information provider's preferences (i.e., the information provider's reputation for supporting certain types of policy) were correct. If correct, perceived information-provider preferences are equivalent to the information providers having a known and informative reputation for supporting certain types of policy. If incorrect (which is quite possible in this case considering the insurance industry and trial-lawyer attempts to shield their identities), then perceived information-provider preferences will not be sufficient to allow badly informed voters to overcome their lack of encyclopedic knowledge.
For our purposes, it is unfortunate that evaluating the accuracy of insurance reform voter perceptions is quite difficult. Fortunately, we need not make this explicit evaluation to determine whether knowledge of a prominent information provider's preferences allowed otherwise uninformed voters to vote as though they were well informed. We can simply compare the behavior of voters who differ only in the amount and types of information they possess. With this type of comparison in mind, I developed and executed an exit poll of insurance reform voters. In an attempt to distinguish relatively informed voters from those who were relatively uninformed, I designed the survey to provide individual-level measures of the amount of encyclopedic information that a respondent possessed. To determine what impact, if any, information shortcuts had on voting behavior, I also asked respondents to report their perceptions of opinions that could have been used as shortcuts, relevant demographic questions, and their voting behavior.
My plan was to use these measures to compare the behavior of well-informed voters, relatively uninformed voters who knew a shortcut, and relatively uninformed voters who did not know that shortcut. Finding that the voting behavior of "relatively uninformed voters who knew a shortcut" was significantly different from the voting behavior of "relatively uninformed voters who did not know a shortcut" would lead me to reject the hypothesis that knowing the shortcut did not affect voting behavior. Finding that the voting behavior of "relatively uninformed voters who knew a shortcut" was also very similar to the voting behavior of "relatively informed voters" would provide support for the assertion that voters who appeared to possess low levels of encyclopedic knowledge used certain types of shortcuts to emulate the voting behavior they would have exhibited if they were relatively well informed. In contrast, finding that the voting behavior of "relatively uninformed voters who knew a shortcut" was very different from the voting behavior of "relatively informed voters" would suggest that knowing the shortcut was insufficient for voters to overcome their lack of encyclopedic information.
A SURVEY TO TEST FOR THE EFFECTS OF INFORMATION
The survey consists of exit interviews with 339 voters in Los Angeles County. Respondents were asked how they voted on the insurance reform propositions, socioeconomic and insurance-rate-related questions, and a series of questions designed to elicit the level of information (or confusion) that each respondent had on the issue of insurance reform. The information questions were designed to learn not only what respondents knew about the content of the insurance reform debate but also to gauge respondent beliefs about information-provider preferences. The information questions used in the analysis appear in Appendix B.
To execute the survey instrument, I recruited 30 undergraduates from the California Institute of Technology, California State University (Northridge), and Pasadena City College. The pollsters received extra credit in political science and economics classes in exchange for attending two instructional sessions and administering the poll for four hours on Election Day. Lecturers at these institutions received a day off from lecturing in exchange for providing me with access to their students. In effect, I received low-cost pollsters in exchange for lecturing about the results of the exit poll in the students' classes. The entire survey was conducted for less than three hundred dollars.
In the instructional sessions, I stressed careful execution of the polling, as opposed to maximizing the number of respondents. I directed the pollsters to use a randomizing mechanism to select respondents in the hope that this would dampen any selection bias. Specifically, I instructed pollsters to choose every fifth exiting voter, with counting to begin only after an interview was completed. In addition, there was no reward to a pollster for the number of surveys completed.
The sample we obtained is neither large enough nor diverse enough to make broad generalizations about insurance reform voting behavior. Fortunately, making these generalizations was not our intention. Our purpose was to contact voters with varying amounts and kinds of information in an attempt to learn more about the effect of different types of information on voting behavior. Financial and physical limitations led me to restrict our polling universe to a ten-city area located in Los Angeles County and centered about the city of Pasadena. I chose polling places in areas across which there was a variance in the cost of auto insurance, the average number of accidents, and the cost of insurance claims." I reasoned that these variables would be correlated with insurance rates, interest in the insurance reform issue, and the propensity to obtain information. Given these constraints and goals, I was able to obtain a sample that included enough variation for me to explore the relationships I have described. Appendix C shows how the 339 respondents compared to the voters of Los Angeles County and the State of California.
For the purposes of analysis, I feel justified in assuming that our respondents were also consumers of insurance, since nearly all of our respondents (98.7%) reported living in a household where a car was insured. Correspondingly, I also assume that (1) respondent preferences over electoral outcomes do not vary systematically with the propensity to possess certain types of information, (2) the ability to determine the relationship between the proposition and one's own well-being does vary with the propensity to possess certain types of information, and (3) all respondents prefer electoral outcomes that result in either a lower premium or a higher expected value of compensation in the event of an accident.'2 Finally, each respondent was given a two-sided card at the beginning of the interview. One side of the card had a description of each insurance proposition exactly as it appeared on the official ballot (see Appendix A). We allowed respondents to see the summaries during the interview in order to minimize the effects of variance in non-information-related recall ability. The other side of the card was used for asking potentially sensitive socioeconomic and insurance-rate-related questions. Instead of giving numbers for income, age, traffic violations, or insurance premiums, respondents selected from lettered categories that were listed on the card.
Empirical Model
I shall now use a series of multivariate logit regressions to identify the determinants of respondent voting behavior. I present one logit for each of the five propositions. In each logit, the dependent variable is the binary variable Vote. Vote equals 1 for a yes vote on the proposition and 0 for a no vote. Thus, positive coefficients for the independent (explanatory) variables imply that having the characteristic presumed to generate the independent variable is associated with a greater propensity to cast a yes vote. The model used in the estimation is as follows: For example, if a respondent could identify correctly the insurance industry's preference with respect to Propositions 100 and 104, then the value of INSUR-ANCE would be 1 for the Proposition 100 estimation, 1 for the Proposition 104 estimation, and 0 for the other three estimations for that respondent. Also notice that each of these variables is used only in estimations that correspond to campaigns with which the relevant information provider was directly involved (see Table 1 ).
To determine the extent to which a respondents' knowledge of these endorsements enhanced their ability to vote as though they were relatively well informed, I must first show that "knowing the shortcut" affected voting behavior. To test for this effect, I use the survey responses to evaluate the null hypothesis, namely, "The information shortcut has no effect on voting behavior (e.g., Ho : 14 = 0 If respondents prefer lower premiums and highervalued policies (as their status as consumers had led me to assume), then they should be likely to favor propositions that mandate lower insurance premiums (100, 103, 104) and increase competition in the provision of insurance (100, 103). For the same reasons, respondents should also be likely to oppose propositions that restrict a claimant's ability to collect from an insurance company (101, 104, 106). Since I expect that respondents with greater KNOWLEDGE would be relatively likely to understand which propositions were consistent with these interests, I predict that the sign of KNOWLEDGE will be positive for The theories reviewed earlier suggest that knowledge of an information-provider's preferences should have a greater effect on the inferences and voting behavior of relatively uninformed respondents (who have more to learn) than it does on the behavior of relatively well informed respondents. Therefore, I include interactive explanatory variables that condition the effect of the INSURANCE, LAWYER, and NADER variables on the respondent's level of KNOWLEDGE. Because relatively uninformed respondents have more to learn, I expect the signs of the interactive term coefficients to be different from the signs of its components. In addition, I expect the magnitude of the interactive term coefficients to be smaller than the coefficients of INSURANCE, LAWYER, and NADER, since even relatively well informed persons may be able to form more accurate inferences about proposition content from their acquisition of knowledge about the information-providers' preferences.
In each of the estimations, I also include measures of potential within-group variance in preferences over insurance reform initiatives to account for the possibility that some respondents may care more about the insurance reform issue than others and, therefore, may feel even more strongly about obtaining lower insurance premiums or higher-valued policies. These variables are described in Appendix D. encyclopedic information on voting behavior and the effect of the shortcuts. Therefore, given the strength of the test and the relatively small sample size, the levels of significance in all five cases are quite remarkable.'7 Since logit coefficients do not provide much intuition about the absolute magnitude of the hypothesized relationships, I report relevant "first differences' in Table 3 . A "first difference" is a straightforward translation of a logit coefficient into a percentage. The first differences I present are estimates of how much the probability of voting yes on the relevant proposition would change, given a particular change in a single independent variable (or set of independent variables) while holding the other independent variables constant at their mean values. For example, the first differences tell us that a respondent who was average in every way except that she provided no correct responses to the proposition content questions had a .17 higher probability of voting for Proposition 100 than did a respondent who was similarly average except for her ability to provide 20 correct responses.
Results
An examination of Table 3 once again shows the relatively large effect that knowing the insurance industry's position had on respondent voting behavior. The lower part of Table 3 shows that whether they knew the insurance industry's preferred electoral outcome or not was the largest single determinant of loW-KNOWLEDGE respondents' voting behavior. Notice also that this effect decreased as KNOWLEDGE increased (because INSURANCE and IN-SURANCE * KNOWLEDGE always had different signs, as expected). For example, knowing that the insurance industry was against Proposition 100 increased by 48 percentage points the probability that a respondent who could provide no correct answers to proposition knowledge questions voted for Proposition 100. The Tables 2 and 3 pro- vide evidence for the prediction that relatively uninformed respondents used their knowledge of the insurance industry's preferences to emulate the behavior of relatively well informed respondents. In every logit, the sign of INSURANCE is the same as the sign of KNOWLEDGE. This implies that whether respondents used encyclopedic information or their knowledge of insurance industry preferences, they formed the same types of inferences about the relationship between a proposition and their own well-being.
To show the effect of the INSURANCE shortcut in a more concrete manner, in 
March 1994
It is also interesting to note that the coefficients of INSURANCE (and KNOWLEDGE) are negative for the three propositions that insurance industry favored (101, 104, and 106) and positive for the two propositions that the insurance industry opposed (100 and 103). In all cases, the signs of KNOWLEDGE and INSUR-ANCE are as predicted. The similarity of the two sets of coefficients supports the notion that relatively informed respondents concluded-and relatively uninformed respondents perceived-that the insurance industry's preferences over electoral outcomes were contrary to their own.'8 This finding reflects well on the insurance industry's attempt to hide its identity, in that respondents who were able to identify its preferences tended to use them as a negative reference. Given the closeness of the vote on Proposition 103 (only 11 out of every 1,000 voters would have had to cast a different vote to change the outcome), we can conjecture that a slightly more successful attempt to detach the insurance industry's identity from their endorsements may have lead to a different electoral outcome.
For voting behavior on Proposition 100, the effect of the variable LAWYER is similar to the effect of INSURANCE but less dramatic. The coefficient for LAW-YER iS significant at the .05 level in the Proposition 100 logit. The negative, significant, and correctly predicted sign of LAWYER in the Proposition 100 logit is consistent with the assertion that respondents perceived the trial lawyers' preferences to be different from their own. However, the magnitude of this coefficient suggests that this shortcut did not affect voter inferences as much knowledge of the insurance industry's preferences did. In contrast, the negative coefficient of LAWYER in the Proposition 106 logit is of a different sign from that of either KNOWLEDGE or INSURANCE and thus contrary to my prediction. These findings suggest that knowledge of the LAWYER endorsement was not as effective a shortcut as was knowledge of the INSURANCE endorsement. Unfortunately, I do not have sufficient data to determine whether this signal was less effective because the lawyers waged a smaller campaign than the insurance industry (less costly and observable effort) or because respondents were relatively uncertain about lawyer views on the value of an insurance policy (lack of reputation).'9 Finally, the relatively small coefficient on the NADER variable may surprise those who recall Nader's role in this election. The interpretation that Ralph Nader had no effect on voting behavior, however, would be going a bit too far. Unlike Voter Revolt (the sponsors of Proposition 103), Ralph Nader had a relatively well known past. I believe that Nader's past and his widely covered and frequent speeches about the insurance industry's big money campaign against 103 were Voter Revolt's greatest asset. With Nader, Voter Revolt was able to prevent the insurance industry from monopolizing the transmission of widely accessible (i.e., mass-media) information. Nader's presence certainly made it easier for some voters to locate the insurance industry's preferences over outcomes. Without someone like Nader, it is unlikely that Voter Revolt could have either received the media attention it did or acquired credibility sufficient to affect voter opinions for those occasions when it did have access to the media.
CONCLUSION
I used a survey instrument to identify the effect of different types of information on voting behavior in the complex insurance reform initiatives of 1988. I showed that respondents who possessed relatively low levels of factual (or encyclopedic) knowledge about the initiatives used their knowledge of insurance industry preferences to emulate the behavior of those respondents who had relatively high levels of factual knowledge. If we believe that well-informed voters make the best possible decisions, then the fact that relatively uninformed voters can emulate them suggests that the availability of certain types of information cues allows voters to use their limited resources efficiently while influencing electoral outcomes in ways that they would have if they had taken the time and effort necessary to acquire encyclopedic information. In closing, I believe that the policy implications of this analysis are quite straightforward: while scholars and pundits propose that we educate the public about politics in order to lessen the impact of uninformed votes on the responsiveness of democratic decision-making institutions, a deeper understanding of how people adapt to the uncertainty that characterizes many of their important decisions suggests that directing our efforts into the provision of credible and widely accessible "signals" may be a more effective and cost-efficient way to ensure the responsiveness of electoral outcomes to the electorate's preferences. 
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APPENDIX C: ELECTION AND POLL RESULTS
The cell entries in Table C 
APPENDIX D: OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
VIOLATOR is a binary variable that equals 1 if the respondent admitted to a traffic violation in the last three years. Since violators face higher premiums than nonviolators, the out come of insurance reform elections are likely to have a greater effect on violators than nonviolators. Mv25 equals 1 if the respondent was a male "violator" under 25 years of age, and 0 otherwise. As a member of this group at the time I designed the exit poll, I knew that male respondents who were under age 25 would pay higher premiums than other violators. Therefore, the outcome of insurance reform elections should have had a greater effect on these respondents than on other violators.
The variable CARTYPE is a discrete variable with values 1-5. As CARTYPE increases, so does the retail price of the particular model. Since insurance rates are correlated with the price of the respondent's car, I expect that (all else held constant) respondents having higher-priced cars will be more affected by the electoral outcome than will respondents with lowerpriced cars. INCOME is a discrete variable that is valued 1-5 and increases with household income. Cutoff levels for the discrete categories were $15,000, $22,500, $40,000, and $75,000. Insurance reform should have a relatively large effect on persons with higher incomes, who tend to purchase more insurance.
As interesting as these concepts are, the variables described in this appendix do not produce significant coefficients. In fact, only two out of these variables' 20 coefficients have coefficients that are larger than their standard errors. While the inclusion (or exclusion) of these variables does not alter the results I have presented, I include them because I expect many readers to question the viability of a statistical model that tests for the effects of different types of information by including only independent variables that are measures of information. 0 to 20) was 14, 1, 3, 11, 4, 7, 2, 25, 15, 7, 26,  16, 43, 26, 10, 35, 16, 33, 7, 2, and 0. 15. The arguments underlying this type of assumption are evaluated in greater detail by Bartels (1990) 17. In case of the 101 and 104 logits, it is worth noting that (1) the dependent variable had relatively little variance and (2) this variable did achieve conventional levels of significance when I used weaker tests of the effect of INSURANCE. Of the respondents who voted on the relevant proposition and answered all of the information and demographic questions, only 22 of 220 voted yes on 101 and only 49 of 221 voted yes on 104. Thus, by attempting to make inferences about voting behavior that rely heavily on the observable differences between these yes-voters and the rest of the sample, we are asking a lot of the data. When we combine the limited variance of the dependent with our relatively small sample size, the fact that our coefficients even come close to conventional levels of significance (both are about one-and-a-half times the size of the standard error) is encouraging. Another part of the failure to achieve conventional levels of significance in the two extreme cases may be that I set up an empirical test in which rejection of the null hypothesis was quite difficult. The advantage of the difficult test is that I am more confident that the magnitude of the INSURANCE coefficient represents the effect of that particular shortcut. The drawback is that if processes that generate INSURANCE and KNOWLEDGE are correlated, this makes the likelihood of a large T-statistic relatively small. I reran the estimations replacing the KNOWLEDGE variable with limited measures of encyclopedic information that had two or 3 categories (low knowledge, somewhat knowledgeable, high knowledge), instead of 20. I found that all of the INSURANCE coefficients achieve conventional levels of significance in these reestimations.
Comparison to County and
18. Notice that for me to conclude that INSURANCE served as an effective shortcut, it matters not whether lOW-KNOWL-EDGE respondents knew that they were economizing on their information costs by relying on the insurance industry preference cue or whether they just did not like insurance companies. For my conclusion to be valid, it is sufficient that use of the shortcut allowed relatively uninformed respondents to emulate the behavior of relatively well informed respondents who were otherwise like themselves (my estimate of how these respondents would have voted if better informed).
19. The insurance industry was able to stifle early triallawyer attempts to advance their preferences by running a series of advertisements pointing out the lawyer sponsorship of certain advertisements. This particular series of advertisements proved so effective that not only were lawyer-sponsored campaign advertisements removed from the airwaves in the final weeks of the campaign, but so were noncampaign related advertisements for trial-lawyer services, at the request of CTLA (Reich 1988b ).
